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THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC
AN ESSAY USING QUANTITATIVE METHODS TO STUDY PUBLIC OPINION
Odile Rudelle +
This article explores the impact of voting procedures on
election results during the Third French Republic . The
combined application of Departmental list balloting
with two rounds and "split ticketing " (right to mix names
on the lists) enabled the electorate to adjust its vote
according to the local situation . In comparing the re-
gional distribution of votes in the 1881 and 1885 elections,
Odile Rudelle reveals different strategies of voting ., the
working of the "Condorcet effect " , and the electoral out-
comes of "Republican discipline " . She comes to the final
conclusion, that the election of 1885 cannot be longer
considered as an "upsurge of the extremes" but should be
interpreted as a choice in favour of Republican moderation.
Quantitative history retained its original economic orientation for
a long time . The objective was to go back in time in order to find
the important statistical series put together by national account-
ancy and in doing so, to try to solve the mystery of the beginnings
of French economic progress . Research has moved on from economic
problems to demography, and from there, through studies of parish
records or wills, to more cultural questions where, with all the
necessary care, a historian such as François Furet wondered if, in
the last consequence, one shouldn't look for the source of French
development . This is why in 1971 at the end of a sort of assessment
article about quantitative history he called for a "politico-ideolo-
gical analysis of past societies ."(l) However, while alluding to
all the long homogeneous statistical series still unused in our
archives, he neglected to mention the uninterrupted electoral series
which we have since 1848.
Far from being an oversight, his silence seems more the ransom paid
for the success of French electoral sociology . Can anything else be
said after the pioneer works by André Siegfried which from the
beginning made electoral geography one of the main branches of
French political science?
+ Address all communications to : Odile Rudelle, Centre d'étude
de la vie politique française contemporaire, 10 rue de la Chaise,
F-75007 Paris .
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I Success and Limites of Électoral Geography
The most valuable aspect of electoral geography is to have shown
the stability of the principal electoral masses in France, lying
beneath the disorder of everyday French political life.
Thanks to the cartographic method, the "conquest of the Republic,
by the Republicans", the opposition between the Conservative West
and the Republican East, and the swing of the Radicals' "red"
South towards the Socialists have all become accepted notions.
In spite of its capacity of synthesis, cartography has not managed
to drain all the information from electoral series . Having a pre-
ference for geographic proximity or the political results measured
by the number of seats won, this method leaves aside ideological
proximity which is the sign of a common opinion, just as it obli-
terates the ambiguity inherent in the fact that one vote must answer
a plurality of questions (By whom do you wish to be governed? What
is the biggest danger to your security and prosperity? With whom
do you identify by voting this way or, on the contrary, against
whom are you voting? etc . . .).
Coming from contemporary political science, these questions have
allowed the electoral series of the first 20 years of the Third
Republic to be reconsidered .(2) These years are particularly inter-
esting from a standpoint of essential features as well as from a
standpoint of particular circumstances . Essential features : these
years when a still unsteady Republic was being established were
also those of strong Republican victories, at first over the "old
parties" which are the Bonapartists and Clerics and later against
the new coalitions such as the "Conservative Union" (Union Conser-
vatrice) in 1885 or in 1888-1889 the organization of General
Boulanger's followers . During these years when the Republic was
fighting to become strong, electoral campaigns were essentially
debates of opinion, and these debates were more general as the
voting expanded . The second reason for interest in these electoral
series is the use of list balloting (scrutin de liste)(3) from 1870
to 1875 and later from 1885-1889.
The first period is well known : the list ballot was the means . by
which the Republicans conquered France . A quantitative analysis con-
firmswhat common sense leads one to believe - the movement of votes
conforms exactly to that of the seats won .(4) Such is not the case
for 1885-1889 where a quantitative analysis shows a big difference
between the movement of votes and the distribution of seats, that
is, between the state of public opinion and the political results
of the election.
We shall first take a general look at the situation before seeing
how the list ballot in the Departments created, thanks to the role
played by the Condorcet effect, a political situation which was the
exact opposite of that which its promoters wanted . Where they hoped
for a strong majority government capable of backing up a four year
ministry, the result of the elections was a Chamber divided into
three hostile sections which would go through no less than seven
ministries in four years .
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The 1881 Chamber had been elected under Gambetta's name . After
Gambetta's death Jules Ferry became Council President (Président
du Conseil) in March 1883 with the intention of leading the legis-
lature to its term of office and putting into law the major
principles of the old Republican program . At the beginning of 1885,
he thought he had succeeded: the preceding summer he had success-
fully carried out the constitutional revision which raised the
Republic above the dangers of universal suffrage . The senatorial
elections in January of 1885 were a huge success for his friends.
And from March 20-24, 1885, his Minister of the Interior Waldeck-
Rousseau had the idea of list balloting voted in, which for him
was to become the "means of a peaceful conquest of France by the
Republicans" .(5) Jules Ferry was hardly enthusiastic for this reform
recommended by Gambetta . However, he was satisfied because he ob-
tained the legislation of the procedure he had already used in
1881: freedom for the Council President to call for elections at
his own chosen date anywhere within the period of two months before
the normal date . Since peace with China was already started, he
thought he would call for the election during the summer and thus
succeed in having his policies ratified by universal suffrage.
Such was not to be, as is known . On March 30, 1885, Clemenceau used
a telegram sent by General Brière de l'Isle to overthrow the ministry.
Strengthened by this long-desired overthrow, Clemenceau engaged him-
self a second time in a six month electoral campaign whose main
theme was war : civil war which would be brought on by the Conserva-
tives, these inheritors of the "Versailles" Assembly who eradicated
the Commune, and war on the outside which the Republicans on
Ferry's side wanted to continue if they came back to the power from
which they had been ousted on March 30th.
Without reaching Clemenceau ' s expectations, the elections of
October 4th and 18th in 1885 were immediately interpreted as a
disavowal of the policies of the preceding legislature : the Moderate
Republicans fell from 412 to 222 seats and found themselves surrounded
by 144 Radicals (instead of 40) and by 201 Conservatives (instead
of 90) . This is what the commentators of that time called an "upsurge
of the extremes", although, as we will show, it was in reality a
massive transfer, with peace being the goal, from the Left Center
towards the Right Center.
How can this swing be explained? By the working of this very special
kind of voting procedure which is the Departmental list balloting
with two rounds and the right to mix names on the lists ("split-
ticketing" ) . Being an election by absolute majority, it is very hard
on minority parties which are eliminated without pity . A two-round
voting process favorizes those who have alliances with other parties
and who can turn a small advance into a big one when they have a
plurality of the votes after the first round . But, being a vote by
lists with the right to split-ticket voting, it also allows voters,
to eliminate certain names on one list and to add names from neigh-
boring (or even opposite) lists so that an entirely new list is
created, comprised of adversaries between which the voter signifies
his refusal to choose . Actually this method of voting, which was
thought to bring about the election of homogeneous lists in the
Departments, had the opposite effect from the beginning in nine
Departments out of 87 where a heterogeneous list was elected .
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Being a paradox, this result was the starting point for a series
of questions which have lead from the movement of seats won to the
movement of votes in order to take the pulse of deep-seated public
opinion . Attention was called immediately to two observations:
on the one hand, the spread of split-ticket voting which concerned
61 of the 87 Departments in the first round, and, on the other hand,
the importance, from one round to another, of transfer voting bet-
ween the two Centers . Such behavior caused the traditional explana
tion of "upsurge of the extremes" to be moderated . On the contrary,
it appeared that by voting simultaneously for adversaries in the
Chamber or by changing sides during the two weeks between the first
and second rounds, universal suffrage was showing how little it cared
about the debates of ideas which the extremes delighted in . This
difference between political professionals - those who have the
monopoly on speaking out - and the masses voting in universal suffrage
who can speak out only by means of their votes, brought about a
questioning of the traditional cartographic method which was founded
on the fact that those elected were adequated with those who elected
them.
If the desired goal was to understand the mechanism which created
this discrepancy between the movement of votes and the movement of
seats, the only way to do this was to group Departments having the
same behavior and then to compare these different types of Depart-
ments . And this was even easier because, since it was list balloting
on the level of Departments, there was a vote as free as possible
from local considerations for the first time since 1875.
In other words, the cartographic method based on geographic proxim-
ity had to be abandoned for a more abstract method based on
ideological proximity.
II A Politico-Ideological Analysis of the 1885 Elections
To carry out this analysis the electorate has been considered as a
whole . A little like a ball of mercury which, when it is hit, is
divided into smaller balls which seek to recompose immediately after-
wards . This way of looking at the election, like a push to be taken,
has made it easy to understand that in 1885 at least, the fundamental
question was one of security : threatened by memories of civil war
which the professional politicians kept bringing to mind, or by more
or less imaginary plans for outside war, the electorate put its
back to the wind, trying to fight the storm in such a way that at
the end of the campaign it would be in a position of optimum stabil-
ity . This will be particularly clear in the second round of voting
when the electorate had to express itself in the confines of the
constrained limits remaining after the first round.
The First Round : October 4, 1885
After the first round, the 87 Departments can be divided into four
groups :
- 38 -
- 'the first(6) is the group of 20 Departments where the Conserva-
tives won all 148 seats in the first round on October 4, 1885.
- the second(7) is the mixed group of 20 Departments where 27
Conservatives and 22 Republicans were elected simultaneously
and where the profile of the lists (for example the existence
of a Left Center list) foreshadows an important transfer from
one Center to the other for the second round.
- the third(8) is the group of 25 Departments where the Republicans
have a majority in the first round and 102 Deputies are elected
out of the 175 seats up for voting.
- the fourth(9) is the group of 22 Departments where the division
between Conservatives, Moderate Republicans, and Radical Re-
publicans is so strong that a whole new round of voting will be
needed.
Table 1 : Voting Participation and Election Returns 1881/1885
(First Ballot)
Registered
Voters
Participating
Voters
Republicans Conservatives Elected
1885 1881/ 85 1881/85 1881/85 Rd 1 Rp 2 C3
Group I 2,697,133 72.5/79 .2 39 .6/34 .9 32 .1 ./44 .8 0 0 148
Group II 2,074, 925 73 .8/81 .0
(Rd l - 0 .5)
47,1/46 .5 22 .7/39 .5 0 22 27
Group III 3,052,835 63 .0/76 .1
(Rd l -
	
1,6)
55.5/55 .2 6.4/26 .3 35 67 0
(Rd l
	2 .6/14 .3)
Group IV 2,389,769 62 .4/73 .5 52.5/47 .0 7 .7/28 .5 0 0 0
(Rd1	13 .4/20 .6) .
Total 10,214,662 70 .5/77 .1 50.3/43 .6 17 .5/35 .4 35 89 175
1 Radicals,
2 Republicans
3 Conservatives
Several immediate observations can be drawn from the above table -
observations which are even more informative when compared with the
1881 results . The most outstanding fact is the rise of the Conserva-
tives (+ 17 .1) which is caused, for one half, by the rise in voter
participation (+ 6 .7) and, for the other half, by the fall of the
. Republicans (- 6 .7) . The Fact that the big political success of the
Conservatives (148 seats won) comes in the 20 Departments where, on
the one hand, the Conservatives already did their best in 18.81 and
where, on the other hand, the Radicals do not exist, disapproves the
traditional opinion whereby "the division of the Republicans creates
Conservative success ." Conservative success in the first round comes
from the combination of a stronger voting participation and of a
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massive transfer of Moderate Republican votes to Conservative can-
didates . The fact that numerous Conservative voters in 1885 had
voted Republican in 1881 (that year in which the Conservatives
seriously lost ground), but probably also in 1876 and 1877 (year
of the combat between Clerics and Republicans) forces one to se-
riously moderate the traditional analysis about the "reactionary "
aspect of the Conservative vote . In simpler terms, it was a pro-
test vote, a criticizing vote against a Republican government whose
foreign intervention policies were disapproved . It was a vote for
peace, in no way a fighting vote against the Republican form of
government.
An analysis of the second group brings one to the same conclusions.
The second group is the mixed group, the one where 3 % of the voters
voted a split-ticket : a proportion which is three times bigger than
that of the rest of France . What then are the characteristics of this
group which has trouble choosing between the Conservative and the
Republican sides? A comparison with the three other groups shows
that group II is closer to group I than to groups III or IV . It
is close to group I by the percentage of voter participation and
by the strength of the Conservatives who even in 1881 never went
below 20 % of the registered voters (as compared to less than 10 %
in groups III and IV) . Here in group II, there is no Republican
transfer to the Conservatives from 1881 to 1885, but rather a
simultaneous vote for both Republicans and Conservatives . Thus,
there is a heterogeneous representation, shared by Conservative and
Republican Deputies who are simply notified that they must come
to an understanding with each other.
Therefore it can be said that the 175 Conservative Deputies elected
in the first round of voting are not at all the result of an
"upsurge of the extremes" nor of a call for revenge against the
Republicans . On the contrary they are the result of a transfer bet-
ween the left Center and the Right Center ; a transfer which, thanks
to the effect of an absolute majority type of voting - "to the victor
go all the spoils", was extremely valorized from the standpoint of
political representation.
However, the effect of this transfer does not stop there . In groups
III and lV the same movement between the two centers would result
in an extraordinary increase coming from slight Radical progress.
How does this work? By the Condorcet effect which is a sort of
optical illusion which has as an outcome the fact that the number
of seats won differs from the movement shown at the level of votes.
The Condorcet effect, analyzed by the mathematician in Parliamentary
voting, comes into play when, in a succession of voting (in this
case the two rounds), a three branch decision (in this case, the
choice between Conservatives, Moderate Republicans, and Radical
Republicans) and a process of elimination (in this case what
Clemenceau will call "Republican discipline") come together . In
this particular instances, the Conservatives' progress caused by
the movement from the Left to the Right by moderate voters will
cause the order of priority within the Republican family to be re-
versed and therefore, the Radicals will find themselves at the top
although their true progress was in reality very slim .
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As an example, look at the seven Departments in group IV where Con-
servative progress put them in the lead after the first round
(Ariège, Aude, Cher, Gard, Jura, Nièvre, Vaucluse):
Table 2 : Election Returns in Seven Type IV Departments 1881/1885
Registered
	
Conservatives
	
Mod .Rep .
	
Rad . Rep.
	 Voters	 1881	 1885	 1881	 1885	 1881	 1885
Total
	
665,462
	
71,255 218,114 208,047 124,915 140,720 164,694
Percentage
	
14 .9
	
32 .7
	
31 .3
	
18 .7
	
21 .1
	
24 .7
In these Departments in four years, the Radicals gain 24 .000 votes
or three percentage points which puts these Departments within the
national average . In itself, it is a small movement, there is not
a landslide . A fact which will completely change the meaning of
the slight Radical progress is the Moderate Republicans fall apart,
which benefits the Conservatives who triple their number . The con-
sequence of the Moderates' fall is the reversal of positions within
the Republican family where the Radicals rise from 40 .3% to 56 .8 %,
that is to say, from a minority position (which put them out of
the second round) to a majority position (which will let them profit
for the first time by the "Republican discipline" which Clemenceau
created for the occasion).
Thus the process which will lead to Radical victory in the second
round (23 seats out of 40) can be understood . It is due less to
their own progress (+ 3) than to that of the Conservatives (+ 17 .8)
who, on the contrary will find themselves without a single seat
after the second round . This is a perfect example of the Condorcet
paradox which can thus be illustrated : When asked "by whom do you
wish to be governed?", the voters answered on October 4th:
1) Conservatives : 32 .7 %
2) Radicals
	
: 24 .7 %
3) Moderates
	
18 .7 %
But since, most of the Moderate Republicans will be eliminated be-
cause of "Republican discipline " (withdrawing from the second round
and asking their voters to vote for the Republican list with got the
most votes in the first round), the answer on the evening of the
second round will, be:
1) Radicals
	
23 seats
2) Moderates
	
7 seats
3) Conservatives :
	
0 seats
Thus, the final answer to the question is radically opposed to the
first answer . This transfer from one Center to the other, which is
typical of the Moderate vote, will result in an extraordinary Ra-
dical advance . And the second round will complete the illustration
of the paradoxical character of these elections by giving the Moderate
Republicans, who were the big losers in the first round, the biggest
benefits of the second .
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The Second Round : October 18,1885
The second ballot took place in the '54 Departments where there was
no majority after the first round
. We will leave aside the part of
the campaign where the Conservatives believe too quickly that the
game is won, while the Republicans call up the threats of civil
war
. A look at the overall results quickly shows that there is a
discrepancy between the movement of votes and the movement of
seats:
Table3 : Variations Between the First and Second Ballot in
54 Departments
	
Voters
	
Republicans
	
Conservatives
	
Seats Won
R
	
C
October 4th
	
4,635,000
	
3,078,263
	
1,747,102
	
124
	
176
October 10th
	
4,577,000
	
2,712,441
	
1,872,805
	
241
	
26
Voter participation is down ; the Republicans lose 350,000 voters,
the Conservatives gain 135,000, but 241 Republicans are elected
while only 26 Conservatives
. The explanation for this contradiction
lies in the fact that the strong Conservative progress does not
take place in the districts where it would have been politically
profitable
. The withdrawal of the Conservative vote in districts
where they were close to victory (just as their progress in those
Departments where the results of the first round would lead one
to think that they had no chance of winning) is another proof of
the essntially peaceful aspect of the 1885 Conservative vote . To
be completely convinced, one has only to look at the pattern of
each election which, in order to maintain its peaceful aspect,
has to change with the local situation.
Six pattern types can be seen:
Pattern 1 is formed by Departments, where the Conservative/Moderate
Republican duel in the second ballot is the same as in the first
round : voter hesitation stopped the whole list from being elected
in the first round
. The two lists were therefore very close to one
another
. Slight Conservative progress would have given the victory.
But this was not to be, as can be seen.
Pattern 2 is formed by Departments, where a Left Center list is
withdrawn : the votes are split between the Moderate Republicans
and the Conservatives who are the only ones to profit in this case.
Pattern 3 is formed by Departments, where a Radical list was with-
drawn in order to give the benefits to a Moderate Republican list:
the voters are satisfied by this because, in this case, voter
participation goes up by three points . This is also the only group
where Moderate Republicans, who are sure of victory here, gain
points from one round to another.
Patterns 4 arid 5, on the ether hand, are formed by Departments, where
in the second round, Radicals are running against Conservatives either
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alone (pattern 4) or alongside a few Moderates (Pattern 5) . In both
cases Republicans lose votes and the more Radicals there are on
the list the more votes they lose.
Finally, pattern 6 is not really meaningful because it only exists
in the Seine-et-Oise Department, the only one to have kept three
lists in the second round (this was the cause of a strong Republican
downslide (- 5 .8)).
Table 4 : Variations in the First and Second Round of the 1885
Elections
Participation Republicans Conservatives Seats Won
1 .
	
Duel
	
in
both rounds -0.8 - 0.1 -
	
1 .2
R
12
C
8
2 .
	
Left Center
+
	
1 .1 - 9.9 + 3 .3 21 15
Withdrawal
3 .
	
Radical
+ 3 .4 + 0 .9 + 1 .3 68 2
Withdrawal
4 .
	
Rd
	
-Rp
+ 0 .6 -
	
1 .8 + 1.5 67 1
Fusion
5 .
	
Republican
+ 2 .2 -
	
2 .7 + 3 .5 60 0
Withdrawal
This table shows more clearly than any commentary the fundamental
moderation of an electorate which wants peace, but also its extra-
ordinary capacity for showing this desire by adjusting its answer
according to the local situation . Conservatives win votes every-
where, except in group 1, where a small progress would have been
enough to let them win all the seats . When the Conservatives come
close to political success, the electorate backs off to stop Con-
servative progress from beeing an anti-Republic revenge.
On the other hand, Republicans lose votes everywhere except where
they nominate the reassuring figures of government Republicans
(Casimir Perier, Sadi-Carnot, etc . . . .), the same ones who, being
close to Ferry, seemed like the big losers in the first round.
These concording remarks lead to the same conclusion : the October 1885
vote was, for universal suffrage, a vote of Republican moderation.
The electorate wanted peace : both domestic and foreign . By the com-
bined effects of the Departmental list ballot with two rounds of
voting and the right to split-tickets, the electorate found itself
represented by a Chamber where the power of the extremes was very
strong . The Radicals wanted "the Republic to be democratized" while
the Conservatives, forgetting for the time being their constitutional
"profession of faith", asked for the institutions to be changed . The
Boulanger crisis(10) will be born of this divorce between the
maximalist desires expressed by the Deputies in the years 1886-1888
and the profoundly peaceful aspirations of universal suffrage which
was not yet flanked by important national political parties .(11)
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-FOOTNOTES
1 François Furet, L'Histoire quantitative et la construction du
fait historique (Quantitative History and the Construction of
Historical Fact), Annales E .S.C . XXVI 1971, p . 63-75 . Reprinted
in 1982 in François Furet, L'Atelier de l'Histoire (The Workshop
of History), Paris 1982.
2 Odile Rudelle, La République absolue : aux origines de l'ins-
tabilité constitutionelle de la France républicaine . (The Abso-
lute Republic : at the Origin of Constitutional Instability in
Republican France), Paris 1982.
3 The "scrutin de liste" is an electoral system whereby each party
proposes a list of candidates to fill the vacant seats in the
district . The number of candidates on each party's list corresponds
to the number of seats up for election . Thus the voter votes for
the whole list of his chosen party . For reasons of simplicity, the
term "scrutin de liste" has been translated throughout this
paper as "list balloting", "List ballot", or "List voting" . The
particularities of this electoral method during the Third French
Republic will be explained on page 5 . (Translator's footnote).
4 J . Gouault, Comment la France est devenue républicaine . (How France
Became Republican), Paris 1954.
5 Journal Officiel, March 21, 1884, pp . 609 and passim.
6 Aveyron, Ardèche, Calvados, Charentes, Cates du Nord, Finistère,
Gers, Indrè, Landes, Loire-Inférieure, Maine-et-Loire, Manche,
Mayenne, Morbihan, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Hautes-Pyrénées, Tarn-et-
Garonne, Vendée, Vienne.
7 Aisne, Ardennes, Corse, Charente-Inférieure, Eure, Haute-Garonne,
Haute-Loire, Isère, Lot, Lot-et-Garonne, Lozère, Haute-Marne,
Oise, Orne, Basses-Pyrénées, Haut-Rhin, Haute-Saône, Sarthe,
Somme, Tarn.
8 Ain, Allier, Hautes-Alpes, Alpes-Maritimes, Cantal, Corrèze
Cate d'Or, Creuse, Dordogne, Doubs, Drôme, Eure-et-Loir . Hérault,
Ille-et-Vilaine, Indre-et-Loire, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Saône-et-
Loire, Savoie, Haute-Savoie, Seine, Seine-Inférieure, Seine-et-
Marne, Deux-Sevres, Vosges, Yonne.
9 Basses-Alpes, Ariège, Aube, Aude, Bouches-du-Rhône, Cher, Gard,
Gironde, Jura, Loir-et-Cher, Loire, Loiret, Marne, Meuse, Nièvre,
Puy-de-Dôme, Pyrénées-Orientales, Rhône, Seine-et-Oise, Var,
Vaucluse, Haute-Vienne.
10 The electoral analysis of the Boulanger crisis is the theme of
the second part of Odile Rudelle's work, Op . Cit.
11 Remember that in France it was not until 1905 and the association
law that political parties could start to be truly organized .
